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Abstract 
After the grounding of the Exxon Valdez, and its subsequent oil spill, all parties with 
interests in Prince William Sound (PWS) were eager to prevent another major pollution 
event. While they implemented several measures to reduce the risk of an oil spill, the 
stakeholders disagreed about the effectiveness of these measures and the potential 
effectiveness of further proposed measures. They formed a steering committee to 
represent all the major stakeholders in the oil industry, in the government, in local 
industry and among the local citizens. The steering committee hired a consultant team, 
who created a detailed model of the PWS system, integrating system simulation, data 
analysis, and expert judgment. The model was capable of assessing the current risk of 
accidents involving oil tankers operating in the Prince William Sound and of evaluating 
measures aimed at reducing this risk. The risk model showed that actions taken prior to 
the study had reduced the risk of oil spill by 75 percent and identified measures estimated 
to reduce the accident frequency by an additional 68 percent, including improving the 
safety management systems of the oil companies and stationing an enhanced capability 
tug, called the Gulf Service, at Hinchinbrook Entrance. In all, various stakeholders made 
multi-million dollar investments to reduce the risk of further oil spills based on the results 
of the risk assessment. 
 
(Decision analysis: risk. Industries: petroleum, transportation. Reliability: system safety) 
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On March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef, spilling an estimated 
11 million gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound, Alaska. The oil spill (Figure 1) 
spread rapidly, affecting more than 1,500 miles of shoreline. The spill had both 
immediate and lingering effects on fish and wildlife resources and on the lives of people 
in coastal communities. The cost to Exxon Corporation for clean up operations was 
estimated to be $2.2 billion (Harrald et al. 1990).  
After the accident, all parties with interests in Prince William Sound (PWS) 
agreed to work to prevent such an event from happening again. They implemented 
several ideas for reducing the risk of an oil spill. They introduced weather-based closure 
restrictions that stopped all transits through Valdez Narrows and Hinchinbrook Entrance 
(Figure 2) during periods of high winds. The US Coast Guard designated Valdez Narrows 
a special navigation zone by restricting passage through the Narrows to one-way for 
deep-draft traffic, including oil tankers. The oil companies introduced escort tugs to 
accompany oil-laden tankers in their transit out of Prince William Sound. These tugs 
were to assist a tanker if they had propulsion or steering failures, attaching lines to the 
disabled tanker and holding it fast, thus preventing grounding accidents. The Oil 
Pollution Act (1990) stated that two escort tugs should accompany each oil-laden tanker; 
depending on the wind conditions and the size of the tanker, three tugs were sometimes 
used. 
In early 1995, questions arose concerning the effectiveness and benefits of 
existing and proposed risk intervention measures. The PWS shipping companies (ARCO 
Marine Inc., BP Oil Shipping Company, USA, Chevron Shipping Company, SeaRiver 
Maritime Inc., and Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Company) concluded that they needed a 
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comprehensive risk assessment to evaluate all proposals. They formed a steering 
committee along with the PWS Regional Citizens Advisory Committee (RCAC) 
[http://www.pwsrcac.org], the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation 
(ADEC) [http://www.state.ak.us/dec/], and the US Coast Guard (USCG). The members 
consisted of presidents of oil shipping companies, local fisherman and environmentalists 
representing the RCAC, senior representatives of ADEC, and the USCG Captain of the 
Port for Valdez. Although the members of the group had different perspectives on the 
operation of the oil-transportation system, the committee captured the substantive 
expertise of the PWS oil transportation and eco system.  
By forming the steering committee, the PWS community formalized its 
preference for a collaborative analysis approach rather than an adversarial one (Charnley 
2000). Up to this point, the adversarial approach had prevailed in PWS risk and safety 
studies, pitting expert against expert. The adversarial approach often leads to a lack of 
trust in the decision-making process and subsequently may hamper the implementation of 
regulations and procedures aimed at reducing risk. Many see lack of trust as the major 
reason for the failure of sophisticated technological risk assessments to influence public 
policy in the nuclear power arena (Slovic 1993). 
The steering committee decided to fund a risk assessment effort for the PWS oil 
transportation system and engaged a consultant team from George Washington 
University (GWU), Rennslaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI), and Det Norske Veritas 
(DNV). The committee stipulated the objectives of the risk assessment effort:   
• to identify and evaluate the risks of oil transportation in PWS,   
• to identify, evaluate, and rank proposed risk reduction measures, and  
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• to develop a risk management plan and risk management tools that can be used to 
support a risk management program. 
This paper presents an overview of the modeling and analysis used in addressing the first 
two objectives, as well as a discussion of the effect of the analysis on the third objective 
and the implementation of the recommendations. 
 
Risk Assessment and Management in Maritime Transportation 
The National Research Council identified the assessment and management of risk in 
maritime transportation as an important problem domain (NRC 1986 1991 1994 2000). In 
earlier work, researchers concentrated on assessing the safety of individual vessels or 
marine structures, such as nuclear powered vessels (Pravda & Lightner 1966), vessels 
transporting liquefied natural gas (Stiehl 1977) and offshore oil and gas platforms (Paté-
Cornell 1990). The USCG tried to prioritize federal spending to improve port 
infrastructures using a classical statistical analysis of nationwide accident data (USCG 
1973; Maio et al. 1991). More recently, researchers have used probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA) (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1975) in the maritime domain 
(Hara and Nakamura 1995; Roeleven et al. 1995; Kite-Powell 1996; Slob 1998; Fowler 
and Sorgard 2000; Trbojevic and Carr 2000; Wang 2000; Guedes Soares and Teixeira 
2001) by examining risk in the context of maritime transportation systems (NRC 1999). 
In a maritime transportation system (MTS), traffic patterns change over time in a 
complex manner. Researchers have used system simulation as a modeling tool to assess 
MTS service levels (Andrews et al. 1996), to perform logistical analysis (Golkar et al. 
1998) and to facilitate the design of ports (Ryan 1998). The dynamic nature of traffic 
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patterns and other situational variables, such as wind, visibility, and ice conditions, mean 
that risk levels change over time. The PWS risk assessment differs from previous 
maritime risk assessments in capturing the dynamic nature of risk by integrating system 
simulation (Banks et al. 2000) with available techniques in the field of probabilistic risk 
assessment (Bedford and Cooke 2001) and expert judgment elicitation (Cooke, 1991). 
The following sections discuss the definition of risk used in the PWS risk assessment, the 
system risk simulation model, the codification of expert judgment, the results of the risk 
assessment, the validity of the results, actions taken following the PWS risk assessment 
and finally the benefits of the risk assessment process followed. 
 
Defining Risk 
Lowrance (1976) defines risk as a measure of the probability and severity of the 
consequences of undesirable events. In the PWS risk assessment, we define the 
undesirable events to be accidents involving oil tankers, specifically the following: 
• Collisions: An underway tanker colliding with or striking another underway 
vessel as a result of human error or mechanical failure and lack of vigilance 
(inter-vessel collision) or striking a floating object, for example ice. 
• Drift Groundings: A drifting tanker out of control because of a propulsion or 
steering failure making contact with the shore or bottom. 
• Powered Groundings: An underway tanker under power making contact with 
the shore or bottom because of navigational error or steering failure and lack 
of vigilance. 
• Foundering: A tanker sinking because of water ingress or loss of stability. 
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• Fire/Explosion: A fire occurring in the machinery, hotel, navigational, or 
cargo space of a tanker or an explosion occurring in the machinery or cargo 
spaces. 
• Structural Failure: The hull or frame cracking or eroding seriously enough to 
affect the structural integrity of the tanker. 
The consequence of interest was oil outflow into Prince William Sound. The initial 
measure the Steering Committee wanted was the expected volume of oil outflow per year 
for each accident type and specified locations. However, after further discussion, it 
decided that any accident involving an oil tanker was an undesirable event, and thus the 
focus shifted to the expected number of accidents per year again broken down by 
accident type and location. We defined boundaries for seven locations to use in the study 
(Figure 2).  
The basic technique used in the PWS risk assessment is PRA (Bedford and Cooke 
2001). In performing a PRA, one identifies the series of events leading to an accident, 
estimates the probabilities of these events, and evaluates the consequences of the 
accident. Garrick (1984) notes that an accident is not a single event but the culmination of 
a series of events. A triggering incident is defined to be the immediate precursor of an 
accident. In the PWS risk assessment, we separated triggering incidents into mechanical 
failures and human errors. The mechanical failures considered to be triggering incidents 
were propulsion failures, steering failures, electrical power failures, and hull failures. The 
classifications of human errors used were diminished ability, hazardous shipboard 
environment, lack of knowledge, skills or experience, poor management practices and 
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faulty perceptions or understanding. We based these on current US Coast Guard 
classifications. 
We constructed an accident probability model using the relationships between the 
vessel’s operating environment, triggering incidents and accidents (Roeleven et al., 
1995). The combination of organizational and situational factors that describes the state 
of the system in which an accident may occur is termed an opportunity for incident (OFI). 
We based our accident model on the following conditional probabilities: 
• P(OFI): the probability that a particular system state occurs, 
• P(Incident| OFI): the probability that a triggering incident occurs in this system 
state,  
• P(Accident| Incident, OFI): the probability that an accident occurs given that a 
triggering incident has occurred in this system state.  
Once one has specified these probabilities, one can find the probability of an accident 
occurring in the system by summing the product of the conditional probabilities over all 
types of accidents and triggering incidents and all combinations of organizational and 
situational factors according to the law of total probability. Thus to perform an 
assessment of the risk of an accident using this model, one must determine an operational 
definition of an OFI and then estimate each of the terms in the probability model. Harrald 
et al. (1998) discuss the operational definition of an OFI in the PWS risk assessment. 
 
The System Risk Simulation Model 
The first term to estimate is the frequency of occurrence of each combination of 
organizational or situational factors, that is, each OFI. Although data is collected on 
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vessel arrivals and environmental conditions, the combinations of these events are not. 
Traffic rules, such as a one-way zone, mean that the movements of vessels are dependent, 
while weather-based closure restrictions cause dependence between vessel movements 
and environmental conditions. A discrete-event simulation of the system captures the 
complex dynamic nature of the system and accurately models the interactions between 
the vessels and their environment.  
We created the simulation model using operational data, such as vessel type and 
vessel movement data from the USCG vessel traffic service, tanker arrival and departure 
information from the ship escort/response vessel system (SERVS), and publicly available 
data, such as meteorological data from the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 
Administration weather buoys. More difficult to obtain were data on open fishing times, 
locations, and durations, requiring local community surveys. Based on the data, we 
developed traffic arrival models and weather models. In addition, because all deep-draft 
vessels transiting PWS must participate in the USCG vessel traffic service and follow a 
defined set of traffic rules, such as weather-based closure restrictions, one-way zones, the 
tug escort scheme, and docking procedures, we programmed these rules into the 
simulation.  
We used the simulation as an event counter, that is we used it to count the number 
of occurrences of individual OFIs throughout the PWS for a given time period. The 
simulation calculated the state of the system once every five minutes based upon the 
traffic arrivals, the weather, and the previous state of the system. We ran the simulation 
for 25-years of simulation time and, for each five-minute period, tabulated the OFIs that 
occurred and thus determined OFI frequencies (Merrick et al. 2000). 
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We estimated the two levels of conditional probability of triggering incidents and 
accidents. The preferred method for estimating these probabilities is through data. The 
steering committee required that we use only PWS specific data in the risk assessment, 
rather than worldwide accident data that might not be representative. Each of the PWS 
shipping companies supplied proprietary mechanical failure data. However, at the time 
we could obtain no reliable PWS human error data in the maritime domain and we could 
obtain very little from near miss reports (Harrald et al. 1998). Large databases of local 
accident data were not available for standard statistical analysis of the organizational and 
situational factors that could affect risk. Cooke (1991) cites the use of expert judgment in 
areas as diverse as aerospace programs, military intelligence, nuclear engineering and 
weather forecasting. We used expert judgment to assess relative conditional probabilities, 
and data to calibrate these relative probabilities.  
Using the log-linear accident probability model (Roeleven 1995), we obtained 
relative conditional probabilities through a regression analysis of pairwise comparison 
surveys (Bradley and Terry 1952) constructed for the pilots, captains, and chief engineers 
with operational experience in the PWS.  PWS oil shipping companies, SERVS and 
regional representatives on the PWS steering committee made these substantive experts 
available for elicitation sessions. An example of the type of questions posed is the 
following taken from the expert judgment questionnaire for collisions given that a 
propulsion failure has occurred (Table 1). In each situation there is an inbound tanker, 
greater than 150,000 DWT in size, which has just experienced a propulsion failure. It is 
within 2 to 10 miles of a tug with tow in winds over 45 MPH blowing on shore to the 
closest shore point with visibility greater than half a mile in the Central Prince William 
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Sound. The only difference between the two situations is that the first situation includes 
an ice flow in the traffic lane, while the second does not. We ask the expert to picture the 
two situations, to determine which situation is more likely to result in a collision and to 
indicate their sense of magnitude in the choice through a nine point scale, with one 
indicating equally likely (Saaty 1977).   
For each question, we changed only one attribute so that the experts could 
estimate the difference in risk between the two situations. The experts could answer a 
book of 120 questions in one to one and a half hours. We put the questions in the books 
in random order and statistically tested the results to ensure nonrandom responses and to 
minimize response bias. All participants had very extensive knowledge, with at least 20 
years of experience at sea. We treated the expert responses as ratios of the probabilities of 
an accident in each scenario. We estimated the parameters of the accident probability 
model using statistical regression and calibrated the model to available data.  The Prince 
William Sound Risk Assessment Final Report contains specific details of the development 
of the simulation model, the design and analysis of the expert judgment questionnaires, 
and the integration of the simulation model and the accident probability model (PWS 
Steering Committee 1996).  
The integrated system risk simulation model was capable of assessing the current 
risk of accidents involving oil tankers operating in PWS and of evaluating risk-
intervention measures. We also implemented an oil outflow model, created by DNV, in 
the system risk simulation program. The program displayed risk in PWS dynamically 
(Figure 3) and we could interrogate it to determine the expected frequencies of accidents 
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or the expected oil outflow per year broken down by accident type, location, and any of 
the organizational or situational factors.  
 
Results of the Risk Assessment 
The steering committee’s first objective was to identify and evaluate the risks of oil 
transportation in PWS. We chose accident scenarios as the method of reporting, defining 
an accident scenario to be an accident type in a given location. We programmed the 
simulation to represent the shipping fleet, traffic rules and operating procedures in place 
in 1996, the year we performed the study. We ran the simulation program for 25 years 
(simulation time) and estimated the expected frequency of accidents. We broke the 
frequencies down by location and accident type to obtain the accident scenario results. As 
the primary interest was accident scenarios with the highest expected frequencies, we 
reported the results by sorting the accident scenarios from highest to lowest (Figure 4).  
Before the risk assessment, people in PWS commonly believed that the most 
likely accident scenario was a drift or powered grounding in the Valdez Narrows or 
Hinchinbrook Entrance. However, we showed that the first seven accident scenarios 
accounted for 80 percent of the total expected frequency of accidents, with 60 percent 
coming from collisions in the port, in the Valdez Narrows and in the Valdez Arm. We 
performed a further analysis to find the primary cause of these accidents. We found that 
the primary risk was collisions with fishing vessels that operate in large numbers in these 
locations during fishing openers. Although they introduce a relatively high risk of 
collision, few fishing vessels are large enough to penetrate the hull of a tanker. Thus the 
expected oil outflow from these events was low. The perceived high-risk scenarios of 
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drift or powered groundings contributed approximately 15 percent of the expected 
frequency of accidents. 
Integrating the oil outflow model with the estimated frequencies of accident 
scenarios allowed us to estimate the expected volume of oil outflow as a measure of risk, 
again reported from highest to lowest (Figure 5). We discovered a surprising result using 
this metric. Potential collisions of outbound tankers with inbound SERVs’ tugs (returning 
from escort duty) are a large contributor to the total expected oil outflow. Escort tugs 
leaving port with a tanker are intended to save the tanker in case of a propulsion or 
steering failure, but on their return from escort  they introduce a risk of collision and can 
cause enough damage to tankers to spill oil. Less suprising, however, was the 
confirmation of the risk of drift or powered groundings in the Valdez Narrows or 
Hinchinbrook Entrance. 
The steering committee’s second objective was to identify, evaluate, and rank 
proposed risk intervention measures. We developed a set of risk-intervention measures 
for evaluation in consultation with the PWS steering committee. We classified risk-
interventions in terms of their effect on modeling parameters and analyzed them 
accordingly. The modeling required was extensive, but because of the level of granularity 
incorporated in the system risk simulation model, we could change parameters of the 
accident probability model or simulation code to reflect the effects of risk-intervention 
measures. By stripping away previously implemented risk-intervention measures, we 
estimated the risk prior to the Exxon Valdez accident. Comparing this risk to the baseline 
case, representing the PWS system during the study period, we estimated that the 
accident frequency had been reduced 75 percent since the Exxon Valdez accident. 
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We identified further effective risk-intervention measures (Figure 6). Under the 
current system, interactions with fishing vessels and escort tugs were significant 
contributors to the overall risk. We developed rules to reduce the number of these 
interactions in cooperation with the Steering Committee and programmed them into the 
simulation. We demonstrated that modifying the escort scheme to reduce interactions 
with tankers and managing the interactions of fishing vessels and tankers lead to a major 
reduction in risk. The model also indicated that improving human and organizational 
performance through the International Safety Management (ISM) program would further 
reduce risk. We estimated the reduction in risk obtained by reducing the frequency of 
human errors in the accident probability model, with the reduction being estimated by 
personnel from DNV with experience in implementing the ISM program. We showed 
that some proposed risk-intervention measure increase risk, for example we showed that 
additional weather-based closure restrictions would increase traffic congestion.  
Estimates of expected accident frequency and expected oil outflow by accident 
scenario are point estimates of risk. The preferred method for reporting accident risk 
would be a distribution that also represents the degree of uncertainty in the results (Paté-
Cornell 1996). Although we proposed an uncertainty analysis to the steering committee, 
time and budgetary constraints did not allow it. This was a drawback in the study and 
additional research is needed to develop a technique to assess uncertainties in the system 
risk simulation model. The value of an analysis, however, is not only in the precision of 
the results, but in understanding system risk. Unlike risk assessments in more traditional 
areas, for example nuclear power, our focus was the dynamic risk behavior of the system. 
For risk management purposes it is valuable to identify the peaks, patterns, unusual 
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circumstances, and trends in system risk and in changes in system risk made by 
implementation of risk-intervention measures. 
 
Validity of the Results 
In any study, it is important to validate the results. To assess the validity of our results, 
we need to validate both the simulation of the PWS system and the expert judgment 
based estimates of accident and incident probabilities. We used graphical comparison to 
the actual system and numerical comparison using summary statistics to validate the 
simulation part of the model. Specifically, USCG personnel from the Vessel Traffic 
Service (VTS) in PWS, who monitor traffic using screens resembling the graphical 
simulation output, verified the general behavior of traffic in the simulation regarding 
adherence to traffic rules, and patterns of vessel arrivals and departures. In addition, we 
compared summary statistics from the simulation, such as the average number of trips to 
the anchorage area as a result of weather-based closure conditions, the average number of 
tanker diversions due to ice in tanker lanes and the average number of closed waterways 
at separate locations due to weather restrictions, to those observed in the VTS system. 
However, estimates of accident and incident probabilities based on expert 
judgments are more difficult to validate. While the use of proper procedures, such as 
structured and proven elicitation methods, can reduce uncertainty and bias in an analysis, 
they can never be eliminated. As one referee noted, our use of mariners with experience 
in PWS could introduce a group bias. For example, had the Exxon Valdez not run 
aground, the opinions of the experts might have been quite different. The bias the referee 
refers to is availability bias (Cooke 1991), that is, people make assessments in accordance 
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with the ease with which they can retrieve similar events. In the case of the Exxon Valdez 
accident, the effect of the availability bias would be to increase perceived levels of 
accident risk. However, each question in the PWS questionnaires required the 
comparison of two carefully defined scenarios. One could argue that both scenarios 
would be affected by the availability bias in a similar manner. As a result, the effect of 
the availability bias would be reduced. The Exxon Valdez accident scenario (a powered 
grounding of a tanker in the Valdez Arm) received only a modest ranking of 10 out of 17 
accident scenario’s that contribute to approximately 95 percent of total accident risk 
(Figure 4). 
Risk assessments typically deal with low probability, high consequence events, 
and thus statistical validation of their results is difficult even when using nationwide or 
global accident databases. Using nationwide or global accident data in localized risk 
assessments is also questionable in terms of validity, prompting the PWS steering 
committee to require our use of only PWS specific data. This requirement meant we 
could not validate our risk assessment in the traditional sense. In the case of the 
probability of triggering incidents, such as mechanical failures, where available data and 
expert judgments overlapped, we observed good correspondence. Such correspondence 
could add to the validity of the other expert based estimates, where such comparisons 
could not be made.  
In the PWS risk assessment we followed a collaborative analysis approach 
(Charnley 2000). This included educating the steering committee in the language and 
modeling of risk. As we developed a common framework for analyzing risk, we 
discussed proposed risk-intervention measures at the level of their detailed effect on the 
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whole system, rather than their gross effects on one part.  We discussed the assumptions 
behind the model with the steering committee. The members of the steering committee 
were able to challenge the assumptions upon which they based their own opinions 
concerning the operation of the oil transportation system in PWS.  
We presented all our results to the steering committee in monthly meetings. The 
members questioned various results and often required more detailed analysis to reach a 
deeper understanding. The simulation model allowed us to demonstrate many results 
graphically, giving the steering committee a better intuition and trust in their validity.  
Members challenged certain results and often identified problems with the analysis, such 
as incorrect implementation of vessel traffic rules in the simulation, which we corrected. 
The committee put no pressure on us to change results merely because members 
disagreed. In the end, the steering committee unanimously accepted the results we 
obtained with the system risk simulation model despite members’ diverse perspectives at 
the onset of the study. Using the collaborative analysis approach, we built on the 
substantive knowledge represented in the steering committee and instilled trust in our 
results and recommendations, normally acquired through the use of classical statistical 
validation procedures. 
 
Actions Taken 
At the conclusion of the study, our contract team delivered a final report to the steering 
committee (Prince William Sound Steering Committee 1996). This report included 
technical documentation of the methodology used in the study, the results of the 
modeling and recommendations based on these results. Following the risk assessment 
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project, the steering committee split up into risk management teams charged with 
implementing the recommendations in specific areas.  
One of the key questions the steering committee asked at the start of the study was 
whether the current escort system was capable of stopping drift groundings in the Valdez 
Narrows. The study showed that the current escort tugs were capable of saving a disabled 
tanker in the environmental conditions experienced in the Valdez Narrows. However, 
because of other considerations the PWS shipping companies decided to accept proposals 
for two tractor-tugs. The designers used our result extensively in the design process. 
Crowley Maritime Services have invested $30 million to build the tugs Nanuq (Figure 7) 
and Tan’erliq to fulfill the requirements developed. 
To date the various organizations comprising the risk management teams have taken 
the following actions based on our results: 
• The oil companies have introduced an enhanced capability tug called the Gulf 
Service (Figure 8) to escort oil laden tankers through Hinchinbrook Entrance, 
which is being replaced by new azimuthing stern-drive escort vessels designed for  
higher transit speed/open water assist scenarios that include the Hinchinbrook 
Entrance transit. 
• We have completed a further project to find an improved escort scheme, which 
SERVS have adopted, minimizing interactions between oil tankers and escort 
tugs, while maintaining the ability to save disabled tankers. 
• The Coast Guard VTS manage interactions between fishing vessels and tankers. 
• SERVS has increased the minimum required bridge crew on board escort tugs 
from one to two to add additional error capture capability. 
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• The International Maritime Organization has approved a change to the tanker 
route through central PWS reducing the number of course changes required. 
• The shipping companies have made long term plans for quality assurance and 
safety management programs. 
 
The Benefits of the Risk Assessment Process 
It is difficult to compare this project with other more traditional projects in operations 
research and management science, whose benefits are typically measured in terms of 
reduced operating costs or increased profits. The benefits of risk assessments are less 
tangible as the objective is to reduce the occurrence of future accidents. However, 
because clean-up operations for the Exxon Valdez accident cost over $2 billion, the 
benefits of preventing a single such accident would be of similar magnitude. We can only 
estimate the reduction in the frequency of accidents using our models and can only 
estimate the benefits of the study in terms of clean-up cost. Using our risk models, we 
estimated that accident frequency had been reduced by 75 percent since the Exxon 
Valdez accident. According to our risk models, the further reduction in accident 
frequency from all measures taken as a result of the Prince William Sound Risk 
assessment is 68 percent, with a 51 percent reduction in the expected oil outflow. This 
means that, since the Exxon Valdez accident, the accident frequency has been reduced by 
an estimated total of 92 percent. The costs of the risk assessment, roughly $2 million over 
a two-year period, pale in comparison to the potential clean-up costs for a single major oil 
spill resulting from a tanker accident. However, the benefits go beyond clean-up costs 
and include the protection of pristine environments, and the prevention of loss of life and 
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injury to vessel crews. In addition, the shipping companies have used the results of the 
PWS model in making decisions to invest in multi-million dollar equipment. 
While the stakeholders in PWS all recognized the need for a rational method to 
evaluate the merits of risk intervention measures, to improve the allocation of resources 
and to avoid implementing measures that would adversely affect system risk, they did not 
trust ach other at the beginning of the project. The steering committee wanted to use the 
project as a forum to build trust amongst stakeholders, to educate of all interested parties, 
and to provide a common understanding of oil transportation risk. The PWS risk 
assessment fostered a cooperative risk-management atmosphere involving all 
stakeholders.  
At the end of the project, the stakeholders published the final report as their 
document, not just as a report from the consultant team. Members of the steering 
committee from environmental groups, the fishing industry and the oil companies wrote 
joint press briefings and formed risk-management teams to manage implementation of 
the model results. The unified acceptance and presentation of the results of the study by 
all stakeholders and the level of implementation of the results can be primarily 
considered a benefit of the collaborative analysis process. All stakeholders finished the 
project convinced that they had reduced risk of further multi-billion dollar accidents and, 
with the cooperation fostered by the collaborative analysis process, the stage has been set 
for further improvements in managing risk.  
The success of the Prince William Sound risk assessment has not gone unnoticed 
and National Science Foundation has awarded other researchers funding (e.g. NSF SBR-
9520194, NSF SBR-9710522) to study the risk-assessment process we followed. Our 
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study is described as an example collaborative analysis by Busenberg (2000) and 
Charnley (2000). Busenberg (1999) commented as follows: 
 
“All ten of the participants who were interviewed agreed that this process allowed the 
steering committee to gain a better understanding of the technical dimensions of 
maritime risk assessment … The results of the risk assessment were released in late 1996, 
and were unanimously accepted as valid by the RCAC, oil industry, and government 
agencies involved in this issue. The participating groups agreed that the study showed the 
need for an ocean rescue tug vessel in the Sound. In 1997, the oil industry responded by 
deploying a vessel of this class in the Sound.” 
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Table 1. We elicited expert judgments from the substantive experts using pairwise 
comparison questionnaires in which we defined a given scenario and varied only one 
attribute, in this example changing whether there is ice in the traffic lanes. 
 
Figure 1. The stricken Exxon Valdez spilled oil in to Prince William Sound, Alaska 
affecting over 1,500 miles of shoreline. 
 
Figure 2. We divided Prince William Sound into seven locations for reporting risk. 
 
Figure 3. We created the system risk simulation program to perform the analysis 
and demonstrate the results to the steering committee. On the left is a display of the 
dynamic behavior of the Prince William Sound marine transportation system 
including traffic patterns and environmental conditions, such as wind speed and 
direction. On the right, the analysis shown is broken into seven locations (Figure 2), 
with estimates of the probability of an opportunity for an incident, the probability 
of an accident given such an opportunity and finally the dynamic variation in the 
expected frequency of accidents for the whole region.  
 
Figure 4.  We sorted the combinations of accident types and locations by their 
expected frequency (dark bars). The cumulative percentage of the total expected 
frequency up to each such combination (white bars) is indicated by the total height 
of each bar. For example, we found that the first seven accident scenarios account 
for 80 percent of the total expected frequency of accidents. 
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Figure 5.  We sorted the combinations of accident types and locations by their 
expected oil outflow (dark bars). The cumulative percentage of the total expected oil 
outflow up to each such combination (white bars) is indicated by the total height of 
each bar. For example, we found that the first seven accident scenarios account for 
55 percent of the total expected oil outflow. 
 
Figure 6. We tested proposed risk interventions in the system risk simulation and 
ranked them by percentage reduction from the study year in the expected frequency 
of accidents (black bars) and expected oil outflow (white bars) per year. 
 
Figure 7. The 153-foot, 10,000 horsepower, state-of-the-art tractor-tug Nanuq has 
been put in service to escort tankers through Valdez Narrows. 
 
Figure 8. The enhanced capability tug Gulf Service has been stationed at 
Hinchinbrook Entrance to save disabled tankers even in extreme environmental 
conditions.
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Location Central Sound LIKELIHOOD OF COLLISION  Location
Traffic Proximity Vessels 2 to 10 Miles 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  Traffic Proximity
Traffic Type Tug with Tow  Traffic Type
Tanker Size & Direction Inbound  More Than 150DWT  Tanker Size & Direction
Escort Vessels Two or more  Escort Vessels
Wind Speed More Than 45  Wind Speed
Wind Direction Perpendicular/On Shore  Wind Direction
Visibility Greater Than 1/2  Mile  Visibility
Ice Conditions Bergy Bits Within a Mile No Bergy Bits in a Mile Ice Conditions
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1. Port 
5. Valdez 
Arm 
2. Valdez 
Narrows 
3. Central 
PWS 
6. Anchorage 
7. Hinchinbrook 
Entrance 
4. Gulf of 
Alaska 
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0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Collisions in Port Valdez
Collisions in Valdez Arm
Collisions in Valdez
Narrows
Collisions in Central Sound
Drift Groundings in
Hinchinbrook Entrance
Powered Groundings in
Valdez Narrows
Powered Groundings in
Hinchinbrook
Drift Groundings in Valdez
Arm
Collisions in Hinchinbrook
Powered Groundings in
Valdez Arm
Powered Groundings in Port
Valdez
Powered Groundings in
Central Sound
Drift Groundings in Port
Valdez
Drift Groundings in Gulf of
Alaska
Drift Groundings in Central
Sound
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0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Collisions in Valdez Arm
Drift Groundings in
Hinchinbrook Entrance
Powered Groundings in
Valdez Narrows
Collisions in Port Valdez
Collisions in Central Sound
Powered Groundings in
Hinchinbrook Entrance
Drift Groundings in Gulf of
Alaska
Drift Groundings in Valdez
Arm
Powered Groundings in
Valdez Arm
Collisions in Hinchinbrook
Entrance
Powered Groundings in
Central Sound
Collisions in Valdez
Narrows
Powered Groundings in Port
Valdez
Drift Groundings in Port
Valdez
Str. & Fou. in Central
Sound
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-50% -40% -30% -20% -10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Revised Fishing and Tanker
Rules
Improved Human and
Organization Performance
Reduce Propulsion and Steering
Failures  by 50 %
Reduced Human Error
Additional Person on the Bridge
Improved Management and
Crew
Revised Escort Scheme
Reduced Vessel Reliability
Failures (All to best)
Reduced Exposure
Revised Ice Prodecures
Improved Training and
Navigation Information
Stricter Closure at Hinchinbrook
Entrance
Reduced Diminished Ability
Errors
Double Hulls for Tankers
Stricter Closure  Conditions
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